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Constitutionalism in Exile
by
W. James Antle III
Given the Republicans’
well-known propensity for snatching defeat from the jaws of victory, I
wouldn’t bet the farm – or even my modest northern Virginia townhouse – on
them prevailing in the Senate stalemate over judges that currently has
Washington all aflutter. But if the GOP does decide to detonate the
so-called nuclear option, what exactly would the constitutional “day
after” that their liberal detractors fear look like?
We’ve long been told that such
a move would leave a smoking crater where Roe v. Wade once
stood, and that precedents in affirmative action and church-state cases
would similarly go ka-boom. More recently, liberal constitutional
theorists have warned that conservative judicial nominees are part of a
“Constitution in exile” movement that seeks to stitch back together the
legal consensus of 1930, if not earlier.
Hello Judge Janice Rogers
Brown, goodbye Brown v. Board of Education?
In reality, the phrase
“Constitution in exile” – which I would love to have coined – has been
culled from a book review Judge Douglas Ginsburg penned for Regulation
magazine, principally by Jeffrey Rosen, writing in the New York
Times Magazine, and Cass Sunstein, a respected University of Chicago
law professor, to describe conservative jurists and academics with vastly
different legal philosophies.
Consider:
Constitution-in-exile judges are supposed to want to invalidate post-New
Deal economic regulations, like Richard Epstein for instance, in an
expansive reading of our economic freedoms. But Justice Antonin Scalia,
widely touted as a model conservative judge, has been sharply critical of
using judicial power in this fashion. Is he a judicial activist of the
right? Even Clarence Thomas, arguably the most libertarian justice on the
Supreme Court, has not come close to the Epstein line.
We can, for the most part,
agree that alleged participants in this Constitution-in-exile conspiracy
are constitutional originalists – they believe judges should be guided by
the original meaning of the Constitution as amended. But beyond that,
originalists differ widely among themselves. Some favor interpretation
based on the original intent of the Framers; others seek guidance from the
intent of the ratifying public; others still, probably now a plurality,
look to the original public meaning of the text as ratified.
On top of this, originalists
disagree about how deferential they should be toward existing precedent
and other branches of government, especially the legislature. Part of the
case against Robert Bork was that he was too reluctant – not too eager –
to invalidate properly enacted statutes on constitutional grounds. Even
today, when constitutional conservatives aren’t being criticized for
wanting to use the courts to strike down the New Deal, they are being
criticized for wanting to do away with judicial review.
In other words,
originalists are hardly a monolith. And few of judges President Bush is
likely to nominate are among the most aggressive in their use of judicial
power. Even Janice Rogers Brown, whose speeches have given some
conservatives pause, has been more restrained in her actual
jurisprudence. (U.S. civil-rights commissioner Peter Kirsanow has made
the case for Brown
at greater length.)
In a Legal Affairs
debate with Sunstein, Boston University law
professor Randy Barnett – author of Restoring the Lost Constitution:
The Presumption of Liberty – suggested that the
Constitutional-in-exile appellation might be intended to make originalists
sound “like Russian nobility with their shadow governments futilely
planning their return to power from the irrelevant comfort of London tea
rooms.”
Originalism isn’t about
returning to particular period of time in our history or jurisprudence, or
achieving a certain set of results (even if most constitutional
conservatives find some of the results of liberal rulings, such as the
post-Roe abortion regime, particularly atrocious). It is more
concerned with process, recognizing the Constitution as written law that
sets down rules that political actors – be they presidents, legislators or
judges – cannot change on their own. It’s hard to see any other approach
consistently yielding fidelity to constitutional law.
But the people engaged in
Constitution-in-exile fretting do have a point. Liberal anti-originalist
jurisprudence has effectively exiled many provisions of the Constitution.
The commerce and necessary and proper clauses no longer are read to
effectively limit federal power; the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, along
with privileges or immunities clause, have essentially been gutted to the
point of judicial appeal.
The living (presumably outside
of exile) document doesn’t even grow consistently. The First Amendment’s
establishment clause grows while its free exercise clause contracts. The
Second Amendment is read less expansively than favored sections of the
First.
Liberals fear conservative
judicial activism less because of the Bush nominees’ records than their
own. When they held uncontested power over the federal judiciary, they
pioneered the idea that the Constitution mandated their social agenda,
championing novel interpretations never anticipated by the Framers, the
ratifying public or people on all sides of the major constitutional
debates for generations. We needn’t pine for an era of constitutional
perfection that never existed to acknowledge that if there is no
Constitution in exile, there is a Constitution with a lot of its teeth
missing.
I’ll let the cat out of the
bag: I’m somebody who believes that a lot what the federal government has
done since the New Deal is unconstitutional. But I don’t think the
constitutional remedy is for the courts to simply overturn everything, not
that I am up for an appellate judgeship anyway. Notions of judicial
infallibility have contributed to our constitutional erosion by letting
the other branches off the hook.
There isn’t some nefarious,
radical movement afoot to bring back some imaginary Hoover-era
Constitution. But there is a truly radical idea that the Constitution can
be a fundamentally different document from year to year, based on judicial
whim rather than the amendment process.
Note:
My last column, “Conservatives Against Spending Cuts?”, correctly
identified the Institute for Policy Innovation’s Lawrence Hunter as a
conservative opponent of Social Security benefit cuts. But IPI and Hunter
do favor spending cuts elsewhere in the budget to finance SS reform
transition costs, not increased government borrowing. I regret the error.
The opinions expressed in
this column represent those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
the opinions, views, or philosophy of TheRealityCheck.org, Inc.
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